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People pay more attention to corporate earnings quality in recent years because 
of the high frequency accounting fraud. With the separation of ownership and 
management, managers may increase the value of earnings-based awards by earnings 
manipulation. This will constrain the company's sustainable development. So it is 
necessary to do a research on the relationship between management compensation and 
earnings quality, hope to provide some advice for the design of compensation contract 
and reduce management moral hazard. 
Based on pectination of the literature concerned, taking all the listed companies 
in China from 2002 to 2005 as the research samples, this thesis makes researches on 
the topic. The study find some results as follow. First, there is a significant negative 
correlation between management compensation and earnings quality. Second, the 
relationship become insignificant when managers hold some stock. Third, in 
state-owned enterprises the correlation is also insignificant. These results indicate that 
earnings management arises to increase the value of managers’ earnings-based awards 
in our country. But managerial ownership can restrain the behavior. So, it is 
recommended that more attention should be paid to the earnings quality when design 
or evaluate managers compensation. And it is important to combine the earning-based 
compensation with stock option to form a constraint mechanism. 
The innovation of this thesis is that, most domestic research have found that 
management compensation and earning management didn’t show a significant 
relationship.We adopt a new method the modified DD Model to measure the earnings 
quality and do the empirical study. And we find different results. Besides, we pay 
attention to the impact that managerial ownership and ownership property has on the 
correlation of cash compensation and earnings quality. 
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第一章  绪论 
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20 世纪 70 年代，西方经济学家提出了委托－代理理论。委托－代理理论(The 






























以美国 45 家大型工业企业 7年（1953-1959）的
                                                        


















期的报酬与 t-1 期的销售额和利润的关系；t期的报酬与 t-2 期的销售额和利润
的关系；t-1 期的报酬与 t 期的销售额及利润的关系；t 期报酬的变化率与 t 期
销售额和利润变化率的关系；t期报酬的变化率与 t-1 期销售额和利润变化率的















      
Murphy(1985)
[6]











全部财富对 CEO 产出的激励效果中，有近 77%是来自股票所有权的力量。这就是
说，要减弱代理成本， 好的办法是让代理人拥有股权，成为剩余索取者。 
                                                        
③















Hall 和 Liebman (1998)
[8]
对美国上百家公众持股的 大的商业公司 15 年
（1980～1994 年）间的 CEO 薪酬面板数据和绩效的相关性进行研究。研究发现



























收集了 1997 年至 2000 年 76 家上市公司的 CEO 薪酬、总资
产、净资产、主营业务收入、营业利润和净利润等相关资料，采用用逐步回归和
路径分析方法，检验了我国上市公司 CEO 薪酬的激励制约机制和激励制约效果。













































































































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
